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I am often asked to give my opinion on what I consider to be the right policy for 
solving the problem of non-performing loans (NPLs). My response is that NPLs are 
the symptom not the cause of the predicament the Cyprus economy finds itself in. The 
real problem is private sector indebtedness. 
The focus should not be on how to compensate depositors or bond holders or even 
shareholders of the affected banks. It should be on how the over-indebted businesses 
and households can lighten their debt burden and be in a position to engage in normal 
economic activity in a stable and sustainable manner. Cyprus is prone to suffer, like 
several other countries have (Ireland, Iceland, but most notably Japan), from what 
Richard Koo has coined a ‘balance sheet recession’. This happens when a country’s 
economic agents (businesses and households) have taken up so much debt that they 
are not able or even willing to undertake new debt. In such cases, of which Japan is 
the most stark example in terms of magnitude and length, austerity measures usually 
prescribed by the IMF and traditional economic thinking, not only do not help but 
they have the opposite effect of further depressing the economy and causing a 
downward spiral where savings do not go back into the economy as new loans thereby 
aggravating and elongating the recession. Koo’s general advice is that a more 
expansionary fiscal policy is required to offset the fall in domestic demand arising 
from efforts of private sector entities to reduce their indebtedness via increased 
savings in order to prevent the economy from shrinking. 
I believe correct strategies do exist for reducing the high level of indebtedness in 
Cyprus. One is to find ways for the borrowers to benefit from the substantial 
provisions made by the banks (which will continue in 2018). The only reason banks 
prefer to sell their loans (even at huge discounts) is because they consider it to be the 
only way for them to write back accounting profits and thus help them with their 
re-capitalisation needs. 
Following five years of inaction during which NPLs have remained stubbornly high 
the Government is now considering the creation of a “bad bank”. But once again, 
politicians do not seem to understand the real issues and the consequences of what 
they propose. One perhaps should remind many of the politicians who are now 
pushing for this that they were the same people who killed a similar idea in 2013 
when it was put forward by the then Governor of the Central Bank. Be that as it may 
the proposal raises more questions than answers. At what price would the fund/bad 
bank buy the loans? What would they do with them? Where would the funding come 
from?  What would the consequences be for the real estate market? Even more 
importantly, how is this going to help private debt and the real economy? These are 
the real questions no one is asking! 
A good policy would be one that provides the benefits the banks would derive from 
selling the loans (even at huge discounts) but which utilises the provisions to make 
possible viable restructurings and, more importantly, extend new loans to new 
entities. For this to happen one needs to settle an existing loan and to refinance viable 
businesses using the assets that are thus released by creating new SPVs (special 
purpose vehicles – or, more simply, new companies) funded by new loans and by new 
equity. This is why I have been arguing since 2013 that we need a Reconstruction and 
Development Bank or a Development Finance Agency. Not a bad bank, whose main 
objective at best, is to manage break-down assets (rather than to create new 
competitive enterprises). 
For households and small businesses there are other such policies which can be 
pursued. The starting point is to identify what is impeding a settlement within the 
margins afforded by the provisions and causing the economy to be held to ransom, 
with unpaid debts on the one hand and “counterpart” depleted equity on the other 
keeping idle potentially productive assets. For example, there should be a limit on the 
exposure of people to guarantees. There must be a way for borrowers (as there is in 
some other countries - notably the United States) to hand over the mortgaged asset 
and walk away debt free. The aim of policy should be to enable economic agents to 
start again. Unfortunately in Cyprus, bank lawyers and poorly informed borrowers 
have created this mess. The loan contracts asked for the kitchen sink while ignorant 
borrowers and even innocent bystanders (friends and relatives) were willing to sign 
anything that was put in front of them. There is also the moral responsibility of banks 
which should perhaps be made legally binding, in a similar fashion as the Law of 
Fraudulent Conveyance of New York. Under this law, it is considered illegal if a 
lender has given a loan without first assessing the ability of the borrower to repay. 
In such cases, the borrower can walk away debt free (even without losing the asset 
that was put up as collateral). This may be a rather extreme measure for Cyprus and 
one which in any case is unlikely to have retrospective effect, but a law or, better still, 
a central bank regulation in this respect, would surely apply pressure on banks to 
co-operate and even compromise in reaching settlements with borrowers. That should 
indeed be the ultimate aim. To help the economic agents of the country overcome 
their indebtedness and re-enable them to undertake new viable capital 
investments (and take up new loans) in conditions of strong domestic (and foreign) 
demand. Without such policies we will be trapped in a stalemate for too long and this 
helps no one. Not even the banks themselves. 
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